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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GRANT COOPER, 
Defe,ndant and Appellant. 
) 
\ ( 
) 
J 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, Honorable William Stanley Dunford, Judge. 
This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, In and For Utah County, and 
from the judgment and verdict of the Jury in the above 
entitled cause made and entered on the 4th day of Novem-
ber, 1947, and from the judgment and sentence imposed 
upon the Defendant, Grant Cooper, and from the judgment 
of said District Court Judge, the Honorable William Stan-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
ley Dunford, in denying the appellant's motion for a new 
trial. 
The appellant will hereinafter be referred to as the 
defendant and the respondent will be referred to· as the 
State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Grant Cooper, a married man, resided 
with his wife and three minor children at Orem, Utah Coun-
ty, Utah. Defendant is 41 years of age. Subsequent to 
the conviction of the defendant, he was divor.ced from his 
wife. 
Upon complaint of Oliver Q. Elder, father of Doral 
Elder, dated May 3, 1947 (JR. 3) the defendant was ar-
rested for the commission of an alleged felony. Omitting 
the formal parts, the complaint reads as follows: 
"On this 3rd day of May, A. D. 1947, before me, 
W. Dean Loose, Judge of the above entitled court, per-
sonally appeared Oliver Q1• Elder who, on being duly 
sworn by me on his oath, did say that Grant Cooper 
on or about the 18th day of April, A. D. 1947, at Utah 
County~ State of Utah, did commit the crime of a felo-
ny, to-wit: Indecent Assault committed as follows, to-
wit: that he, the said Grant Cooper, at the time and 
place aforesaid, then and there did wilfully and felo-
niously make an assault upon Doral Elder, a male child 
under the age of 14 years, to-wit: of an age of 11 years, 
and did then and there wilfully and feloniously take 
indecent liberties with the person of the said Doral 
Elder without committing the crime of rape, or the 
crime of assault with intent to commit rape on the 
said Doral Elder, contrary to the provisions of the 
statutes of the State aforesaid, in such cases made and 
·provided, and against the peace and dignity of the 
State of Utah." 
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Defendant requested a preliminary hearing and said 
hearing was had before the Honorable W. Dean Loose, 
Judge of the City Court of Provo City, Utah, sitting as 
committing magistrate, on the lOth day of June, A. D. 1947. 
Upon his arraignment defendant entered his plea of "Not 
Guilty" (JR. 31) . 
The defendant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for trial. On the 4th day of November, 1947, 
a verdict of "Guilty as Charged" was delivered by the Jury 
(JR. 24), and on or about the 19th day of November, 1947, 
the defendant was sentenced to the State Penitentiary by 
the Honorable William Stanley Dunford, Judge as afore-
said, for a term of not in excess of 5 years (JR. 43) . 
On the lOth day of November, 1947, the defendant 
filed his Notice of ~lotion for New Trial (JR. 29) and filed 
supporting Aifidavits (JR. 33 to 39). Motion for New 
Trial was heard by the Honorable William Stanley Dun-
ford, Judge, on the 3rd day of January, 1947, and on the 
5th day of January, 1947, the Court denied said motion 
(JR. 46). 
Thereafter the defendant filed and served his Notice 
of Appeal (JR. 47); secured his Certificate of Probable 
Cause (JR. 40) , and perfected his appeal to the Court. 
At the Preliminary Hearing witnesses for the State, 
by their testimony, set the date of the alleged assault as 
having been on Friday, April 18, 1947. (R-47, 48). At the 
trial evidence was introduced by the State to the effect 
that Dora! Elder, age 11, hereinafter called the complaining 
witness, and Ferrell Sorenson, aged 11, had, between 2:00 
o'clock and 3:00 o'clock P. M., on a day during the month 
of April, 1947, the same being that school day when said 
boys had played truant from school, thought to have been 
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Tuesday, April 8, 1947, accompanied the defendant in his 
automobile to the Orem City Cemetery and that while at 
said cemetery the defendant told the boys that if they had 
"3 inches" they could drive his car. That the complaining 
witness had then opened his trousers and, according to the 
sole testimony of the complaining witness, the defendant 
thereupon placed his hand upon the private part of said 
complaining witness. Each boy testified that he had played 
truant from school and had not been at school at all that 
day, although it was a school day (R-29, 44, 60, 68). The 
witnesses further stated that while they were in the said 
cemetery they did not see any other person therein and 
that no one else was present in said cemetery at that time. 
After leaving the cemetery the defendant let the said boys 
out of his car by a store in Orem (R-53) where they waited 
for a while until the school bus came along and then went 
to their homes (R-54, 94). The school bus arrived at that 
particular place about 3:00 o'clock, P. M. each school day 
(R-140). Witness Ferrell Sorenson did not see the defen-
dant "Play Nasty" with the complaining witness and did 
not know anything about the alleged assault until the com-
plaining witness afterward told him about it (R-76, 77, 87). 
Witness Ferrell Sorenson testified, in this respect, identi-
cally at the preliminary hearing. Each above said boy sta-
ted on the witness stand that he was testifying to the truth-
fulness of certain facts because he had been told by his 
mother to so testify. (Doral Elder R-47, 48 and Ferrell 
Sorenson R-71). 
Neither the complaining witness or the Sorenson boy 
voluntarily told his parents about the alleged assault and 
did not report it to anyone at the time it allegedly occurred. 
The complaining witness told his mother about the pur-
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ported cemetery episode only after she had caught him and 
another child "Playing Nasty" (R. 21). Witness Mrs. Sor-
enson, mother of Farrell Sorenson, although a next door 
neighbor and very close friend of the Elder family, did not 
even know of the alleged assault until about May 3, 1947, 
after the defendant had been arrested ( R. 94) . 
The official records of the school attended by the com-
plaining witness and by Ferrell Sorenson disclosed that 
neither of said boys missed school on the 8th day of April 
or on the 18th day of April and further disclosed that Dor-
a! Elder had not missed a single day of school during the 
entire month of April, 194 7, nor had he missed a day of 
school from January to the close of school in 1947 (.R-
137). The Principal of said school stated that he was the 
teacher in charge of the sixth grade; that each of the above 
named boys was in his class; that he personally, orally, 
called the roll each morning and afternoon and that the 
pupils answered "Here," "Present," or gave some compar-
able response, if present, and that he looked to see whether 
the person whose name was being called gave the response. 
He further testified that each said boy was in school at the 
times mentioned above (R-138, 139, 154, 157, 158). 
No one saw Doral Elder and Ferrell Sorenson in the 
company of the defendant. Witness Mrs. Elder saw the 
defendant's car on a Tuesday with some young occupants 
therein but she did not recognize the children as being her 
son and his companion (R. 17, 18, 254). The complaining 
witness and Ferrell Sorenson had been in defendant's car 
several times in April according to their testimony (R-55, 
73). The defendant recalled having given the complaining 
witness, Ferrell Sorenson and Byron Walters a ride in his 
car on a Saturday morning in the month of April (R. 216) 
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and stated that such occasion was the only time in 1947, 
that said boys had been with him in his car. Witness By-
ron Walters testified that about a month before school let 
out Doral Elder, Ferrell Sorenson and himself had hailed 
the defendant and ridden in defendant's car and that such 
occasion was a Saturday forenoon and that as nearly as 
the witness could determine it was on April 19, 1947 (R-
178). 
Prior to the bringing of the instant charge the wife 
of the defendant had made many accusations against him 
to others. The accusations had been to the effect that the 
defendant was guilty of improper relations with boys and 
girls (R-186). Mrs. Cooper had complained of the defend-
ant to Scott Wilkins, Marshal of Orem City. Her char-
ges had not been specific or definite. As a result of her 
accusations Marshal Wilkins commenced an investigation 
which lasted one year and culminated with the bringing 
of the instant charge (R-98). Marshal Wilkins, without 
knowing anything about the instant charge, contacted Mr. 
Elder and Mr. Sorenson and asked them to ask their sons 
if the defendant bothered them (R. 101). Marshal Wil-
kins asked many little boys whether they had been moles-
ted by the defendant (R-193). He also asked many adults 
concerning the sex practices of the defendant (R-194). 
The defendant went to the Provo City Police as soon as 
he found that Marshal Wilkins was asking children if he 
bothered them, which was in November, 1946. He told 
the desk sergeant on duty at said police station about the 
charges that were being made against him by the Orem 
Marshal. The Provo Police took no action at all (R. 218, 
219). 
The defendant denied that he had ever touched the 
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private parts of Doral Elder of any other young boy. De-
fendant admitted that during the several years that he had 
known and had been working with Doral Elder and other 
neighborhood boys he had on several occasions answered 
questions relative to sex matters (R-200, 201, 202, 203). · 
The defendant is employed, has a supervisory job, and has 
about 35 men under his supervision. Defendant had taken 
an active interest in youth activities for about 20 years 
prior to the bringing of this charge and had served as a 
scoutmaster and in various other capacities (R-206). At 
the time this charge was brought the defendant was a 
troop comrititteeman at Orem, Utah, and had been in that 
position for some two years. The defendant denied that 
he had been to theOrem City Cemetery as claimed and de-
nied that he had been to said cemetery at all in 1947. 
The reputation in the community for truth and ver-
acity of Doral Elder was bad (R-145), whereas the repu-
tation in the community for truth and honesty of the de-
fendant, as well as his reputation for morality, was good 
(R-173). 
Other facts, together with the Record citation there-
for, are set out in connection with the argument herein. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The Court erred in admitting testimony of a wit-
ness, not the complaining witness, relating to purported 
indecent assaults by the defendant upon the person of said 
witness and not connected with or relevant to the instant 
charge. 
2. The court erred in failing and refusing to give the 
Jury the cautionary instruction, or its equivalent, as re-
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quested by defendant's request No. 1, which reads as fol-
lows: 
"The jury must bear in mind that in a criminal 
prosecution for ~xual offense, a charge is easily made 
and filed, but very difficult to disprove." 
The court erred in giving to the jury the Court's In-
struction No. 8, which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that in order to find the de-
fendant guilty of either crime charged in the informa-
tion, it is not necessary that the state prove that the 
circumstances constituting the offense charged occurred 
on the 18th day of April, 1947, but it is necessary that 
the evidence introduced in the case establish to your 
satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that the offense 
charged occurred at or near the cemetery at Orem, 
Utah County, Utah, in an automobile in which the de-
fendant, Grant Cooper, Doral Elder and Ferrell Soren-
son were sitting. And unless the evidence so estab-
lishes beyond a reasonable doubt, it is immaterial and 
can make no difference to this charge that you find 
or believe, if you do find or believe, that the defendant 
did at some other time or place take indecent liberties 
with or upon the person of Doral Elder." 
4. That the court erred in denying defendant's Mo-
tion for a New Trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence which could not with reasonable diligence have 
been produced at the trial. 
5. That the court erred in denying defendant's Mo-
tion for New Trial on the ground that action and state-
ments by the prosecuting attorney which were prejudicial 
to the substantial rights of the defendant were allowed or 
permitted at the trial. 
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QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED 
1. Whether testimony concerning separate sexual of-
fenses against the person of one not the complaining wit-
ness, not legally connected with the instant charge nor 
tending to establish any material issue in dispute therein, 
is properly admissible in evidence. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's Motion for New Trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence where such evidence is rele-
vant; not cumulative; would probably produce a different 
result on retrial, and where the same could not reasonably 
have been produced at the trial. 
3. Whether the court's Instruction numbered 8 was 
contradictory, ambiguous, and uncertain on its face and 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
4. Whether in a case involving an alleged sexual of-
fense, where the prosecuting witness is a child, where the 
testimony is not corroborated, where the evidence is ques-
tionable and where the prosecuting witness has been 
coached, the trial court is warranted in refusing to give a 
cautionary instruction where such instruction, otherwise 
proper, has been requested by the defendant. 
5. Whether conduct and statements of the prosecut-
ing attorney prejudicial to the substantial rights of the de-
fendant, were allowed or permitted at the trial. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN ADMI'ITING TESTIMONY OF 
PURPORITED ASSAULTS BY THE DEFEND~ 
UPON THE PERSON OF ANOTHER, NOT THE 
COMPLAINING WITNESS, NOT CONNECTED 
WITH OR RELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CHARGE. 
The State called to witness one Gary Wilkinson, aged 
12 years, whose testimony on direct examination was to 
the effect that he had met the defendant, sometime after 
the instant charge had been brought, at a drug store in Pro-
vo. That the defendant had asked the said witness if he 
could see him for a moment and that the two of them had 
then stepped into the office entrance of the Knight Building 
on Center Street in Provo and had stood there talking. 
That the defendant asked said witness if he was going to 
go on the witness stand and pulled a pocket knife out of 
his pocket, whereupon said witness had run out of the en-
trance and caused the defendant to be arrested. That 
the witness had been with the defendant "Quite a few 
times" during the 3 years that he had known him and that 
he ran because he was frightened. (R. 118, 119, 120, 122). 
Upon cross-examination, so far as is here material, 
counsel for defendant examined the boy as to the fear he 
had expressed. (R. 127, 128). On direct examination the 
witness had testified that he had been with the defendant 
on numerous occasions and it should be noted that at no 
place in the direct examination of said witness was there 
produced any testimony which in any way tied the evidence 
being elucidated from the witness to the matter before the 
court. 
On redirect examination, over objection by the de-
fenqant, the prosecuting attorney was permitted by the 
court to draw from said witness evidence to the effect that 
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the defendant had committed indecent assaults upon the 
person of said witness. (R. 128, 129). 
The cross-examination of the witness as to the knife 
episode, which concerned .itself with an immaterial, sepa-
rate, and distinct offense from that for which the defendant 
was on trial did not open the door to the introduction of 
other evidence concerning still another immaterial and 
separate and distinct offense purportedly committed against 
the person of one not the complaining witness. On a charge 
involving illicit sexual relations by consent, subsequent 
offenses of like character between the parties may be rele-
vant, because the extreme intimacy and the amorous incli-
nation and willingness evidenced by the commission of such 
offenses are a growth preceding the offense and are rather 
nourished than annihilated by their exercise. 20 Am. Jur. 
290- Evidence Par. 311. But, in a prosecution for statutory 
rape, for example, the prosecution may not show that the 
defendant has had sexual intercourse with other young fe-
males or that he has committed other crimes or immoral 
acts. State v, Irwin, 71 Pac. 608; People v. Gibson, 99 N. E. 
599; Lee v. State, 72 S. W. 1005. 
In a prosecution for one crime proof of another direct 
substantial crime is never admissible unless there is some 
legal connection betwen the two, upon which it can be said 
that one tends to establish the other, or some essential fact 
in dispute. People v. Gibson, supra; State v. Gaimos, 
(Mont.) 162 Pac. 596; Birmingham v. State, 279 N. W. 15. 
Evidence concerning other purported crimes is not admis-
sible except where such evidence is legally connected and 
is relevant and material to the charge which has been 
brought and the courts stress the importance of such requi-
site due to the nature and prejudicial character of such evi-
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dence. 20 Am. Jur. 298 - Evidence Par. 316; United States 
v. Dressler, 112 Fed. ( 2) 972. 
There was no indication whatever that the witness 
from whom the foregoing testimony was drawn knew any-
thing about the charge upon which the defendant was be-
ing tried or that he could properly testify as to any materi-
al matter in connection with the issue before the Court. 
Counsel for the defendant pointed out the immateriality 
thereof to the Court: 
"Your Honor, I don't believe that this is quite 
proper here. We are not tying this thing in with the 
charge, and, Your Honor, we can't possibly be prepared 
to meet all of these things that the prosecutor can dig 
up." (R. 128). 
It is to be doubted that anyone reading the Record in 
the instant case would fail to be impressed by the lengths 
to which the prosecuting attorney went to place before the 
jury irrelevant and inadmissible, but highly prejudicial, evi-
dence. Had the question of the witness's fear been a ma-
terial and competent factor in the consideration of the is-
sue before the jury, there might have been some justifica-
tion for the admission of the evidence in question. However, 
in the instant case, whether the witness had or had not been 
frightened by the episode of which he was testifying, was 
of no probative value whatever to the jury in arriving at 
tQeir conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant on the charge for which he was being tried. Since none 
of the evidence elucidated from said witness was relevant 
to or connected with the charge, it was not properly admis-
sible and should not have been admitted over objection by 
the defendant. 
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The foregoing incident does not stand alone, of its kind, 
in this record. Over objections by defense counsel the 
Orem City Marshal, Wilkins, was permitted to place before 
the jury evidence to the effect that he had received a com-
plaint of indecent assault by the defendant upon the per-
son of one Grant McCune. (R. 99, 100). Such matter was 
in no way connected with the instant charge and the state-
ment was inadmissible as evidence in this case .. 
The language of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 
Leahy v. State, 48 N. W. 390, is particularly applicable here: 
"The State has guaranted to everyone a fair trial, 
and such trial cannot be had if the prosecutor can re-
sort to tricks to secure a conviction." 
Obviously it was the purpose and intent of the prose-
cutor to inject the foregoing irrelevant evidence into the 
case for the prejudicial effect it would have upon the jury. 
It is true that in overruling the defendant's objection to the 
admission of witness Wilkinson's testimony here complained 
of, the Court comented: 
"Well, on that basis, I think I will overrule the ob-
jection, however, I think it is proper to instruct the 
jury that the question is answered only on redirect ex-
amination for the fear that the boy said he had of the 
defendant. With that instruction, the objection is over-
ruled." 
Aside from the aforesaid comment the Court did not 
specifically instruct the jury with respect thereto or cau-
tion the jury with any particularity whatever as to the use 
they could make of it. Moreover, the nature of the evi-
dence was such that even a most particular instruction by 
the Court to the jury with respect to the use thereof would 
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not have adequately safeguarded the defendant against the 
prejudicial effect of the admission thereof in evidence. Evi-
dence is not competent which shows that the defendant 
may have committed other crimes of a like nature, upon 
some person other than the complaining witness, for the 
purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the 
crime charged in the indictment, for ordinarily such proof 
will not reflect any light upon the special crime for which 
the defendant stands charged. This is one of the disting-
uishing features between common-law jurisprudence and 
the Civil Law. People v. Grotz (N.Y.) 105 N. E. 843; Boyd 
v. U\nited States, 142 U. S. 450. 
There can be little doubt but that the evidence in ques-
tion was entirely incompetent and that its effect on he jury 
was highly prejudicial to the defendant's cause, thereby ne-
cessitating a reversal. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
The Court erred in its 8th Instruction to the jury, said 
Instruction being as follows: 
"You are hereby instructed that in order to find 
the defendant guilty of either crime charged in the in-
formation, it is not necessary that the state prove that 
the Circumstances constituting the offense charged oc-
curred on the 18th day of April, 1947, but it is neces-
sary that the evidence introduced in the case establish 
to your satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that the 
offence charged occurred at or near the cemetery at 
Orem, Utah County, Utah, in an automobile in which 
the defendant, Grant Cooper, Dora! Elder and Ferrell 
Sorenson were sitting. And unless the evidence so es-
tablishes beyond reasonable doubt, it is immaterial and 
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can make no difference to this charge that you find or 
believe, if you do find or believe, that the defendant 
did at some other time or place take indecent liberties 
with or upon the person of Doral Elder." 
The complaint on file herein alleged that the offense 
for which defendant was being charged occurred "On or 
about the 18th day of April, 1947." (JR-3). At the pre-
liminary hearing the time of the purported offense was set 
by the prosecution witnesses as Friday, the 18th day of 
April (R. 47, 48). The information filed herein charges 
that the offense was committed "On or about the 18th day 
of April, 1947." (JR-5). At the trial of the cause the evi-
dence of the same prosecution witnesses fixed the time of 
the cemetery episode as having been on the day that Doral 
Elder and Ferrell Sorenson played truant from school (R. 
60, 62). One of the offenses mentioned, the one for which 
the prosecution apparently sought conviction, allegedly took 
place within the Orem City Cemetery (R. 50, 51). 
At the trial the prosecuting attorney adduced evidence 
from Doral Elder and Ferrell Sorenson which was to the 
effect that the defendant had committed several indecent 
assaults upon their persons: 
Q. Now, has he ever done or attempted to do that 
with you before? 
A. Yes. (R. 33, Doral Elder). 
Q. About how many times, if you remember? 
A. Oh, about five times. (R. 33, 34, Doral Elder). 
Q. Had you ever been with Doral Elder and the de-
fendant before when the defendant attempted to play dirty 
with either of you? 
A. Yes, Sir. (R. 69, Ferrell Sorenson). 
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Q. About how many times, as nearly as you can re-
member? 
A. Oh, two or three times. 
Q. Did he do the same thing; that is, play with your 
penis? 
A. Yes, Sir. (R. 69, Ferrell Sorenson). 
Q. Now let's talk just a minute about this cemetery 
episode. How long before that had it been since you had 
been out with the defendant in his car? 
A. A few days. (R. 83, Ferrell Sorenson). 
Q. How long? 
A. A few days. 
Q. Just a few days? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. Who was with you? 
A. Just me and Doral. 
Q. Just you and Doral. And you had been with him 
just a few days before in his car before you went up to the 
cemetery? 
A. Yes, Sir. (R. 83, Ferrell Sorenson). 
Q. And I will ask you further if you ever talked to 
defendant Grant Cooper and told him you were having 
trouble with your penis and couldn't pull the foreskin back? 
A. I told him I couldn't pull the foreskin back, but 
I didn't tell him I was having trouble with it. (R. 259, Dor-
al Elder). 
Q. Did you ask him about it, or did he ask you about 
it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. And was that during one of the times when he was 
playing nasty with you? (Boldface supplied) . 
A. Yes, Sir. (R. 260, Dora! Elder). 
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Hence, the record is replete with accusations covering 
three or four purported indecent assaults, all of which pur-
portedly took place in the defendant's automobile in which 
the defendant Grant Cooper, Doral Elder and Ferrell Soren-
son were sitting and for which neither time or place is de-
signated. Both time and place are left to the conjecture 
and speculation of the jury. 
At the close of the trial the prosecuting attorney, ap-
parently recognizing the difficulty inherent in the situation, 
moved the Court "That the information be amended to con-
form to the proof, to read April 8th, instead of the 18th," 
and stated, "Well, I just want to make sure there will be no 
uncertainty." (R. 281). In refusing the motion the Court 
stated: 
"The Court has drawn its instructions on the basis 
of the information as it is, and I don't see that there 
would be any need of making any amendment. The 
motion will be denied." 
The Court's 8th instruction to the jury is clearly er-
roneous, confusing and contradictory and it laid a founda-
tion for a verdit of guilty by the jury under which both time 
and place of the offense upon which conviction rests are 
vague and uncertain. It left to the jury a broad range for 
conjecture and speculation with nothing to limit the mem-
bers of the jury to a mutual selection of the same purported 
offense as the basis for their verdict. As stated by this 
Court in State v. Hillberg, 61 Pac. 215, 217: "Under the 
charge as given, there was no certainty whatever that the 
jurors all united upon the same act in finding the defendant 
guilty." The instruction in question in the instant case does 
not even limit or confine the jury to the selection of an 
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event which had occurred within the statutory period. Cf. 
State v. Distefano, 262 Pac. 113, and authorities there col-
lected. Nor, does the instruction confine the jury to the 
selection of the event which allegedly happened within the 
Orem City Cemetery. The words "At or Near" the ceme-
tery are vague, indefinite and uncertain and pave the way 
for the selection by the individual members of the jury of 
any one of the three or four purported assaults covered by 
the evidence for which neither time nor place is designated. 
The decisions of the Court in State v. Distefano, supra, 
and State v. Rosenberg, 35 P (2) 1004, are distinguishable 
from the instant case. Aside from material differences in 
circumstance and evidence, the instructions given in each 
of those cases were very particular. In the Rosenberg case 
the information alleged the "26th day of June" and the 
evidence was directed to but one sexual act and no other 
acts of any kind were shown. The trial court there instruc-
ted the jury that they were limited to the exact place tes-
tified to by the prosecuting witness, the "B.A.C. Campus." 
In the Distefano case the trial court limited the jury to that 
event which had occurred "On or about the 8th day of Sep-
tember, 1926, a short distance South, and across an irriga-
tion ditch, near a big tree, from her home, as testified to 
by the complaining witness, xx." The very particular spe-
cification as to place found in each of the above cases is en-
tirely absent in the instant case. "At or Near" a given 
place, such as an inclosure like a cemetery, would not ap-
pear to limit the jury to the selection of an event occurring 
within the cemetery. 
The defendant urges that the decision of the Court in 
State v. Wade, 67 P (2) 647, is applicable here. In that 
case the court held, in effect, that the trial court should 
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restrict the jury in their deliberations to the time and place 
fixed by the evidence and should not permit the jury to 
speculate whether the act might have taken place on some 
other date or at some other time and place not shown by 
the evidence. In the Wade case, supra, a defense of alibi 
was interposed. However, while that is a factor not here 
present, that case does not appear to have been decided on 
that point. The Court at page 651 stated: "The situation, 
in view of what has been said, assumes a more serious as-
pect than a mere failure to instruct on the alibi phase of 
the case." 
Defendant concedes that the State is not bound by or 
limited to the date set forth in the information. But, de-
fendant strenuously urges that when the State, by its evi-
dence at the trial, deviates from the information and fas-
tens its case to some particular time and place, the State 
is bound and limited to a conviction for that event. State 
v. llillberg, supra. 
Moreover, the instruction as given by the Court is pat-
ently conflicting, ambiguous and confusing on its face. Said 
instruction first informs the jury that time is immaterial, 
that is, that they did not have to find that the offense oc-
curred on the 18th of April, but that it was necessary for 
them to find that it occurred "At or Near the cemetery at 
Orem, Utah County, Utah, in an automobile in which the 
defendant, Grant Cooper, Doral Elder and Ferrell Sorenson 
were sitting." The instruction then goes on to inform the 
jury that it can make no difference to this charge if they 
find or believe "That the defendant did at some other time 
or place take indecent liberties xx." The only time men-
tioned is the 18th day of April, 1947, and there was no evi-
dence whatever that the offense ocurred on that said date. 
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It seems quite apparent that the instruction herein con• 
sidered was erroneous and confusing; that it deprived the 
defendant of the safeguards provided by law, and that in 
the circumstances of the case was so prejudicial to the de-
fendant as to necessitate a reversal. 
THE FAILURE OF THE CQURT TO GIVE A CAUTION-
ARY INSTRUCTION, AS REQUESTED BY Tim DE-
FENDANT, WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Defendant requested the Court to give the following 
cautionary instruction: 
"The jury must bear in mind that in criminal pro-
secutions for sexual offenses, a charge is easily made 
and filed but very difficult to disprove." (Defendant's 
request No. 1). 
The Court refused to give the instruction as requested 
and failed and neglected to give its equivalent. The fail-
ure of the Court to so instruct the jury is, in view of the 
evidence, circumstances and factors present in the instant 
case, reversible error. 
The evidence discloses that the alleged assault was 
upon the person of an eleven year old boy. (R-11). The 
purported assault was in the afternoon in an automobile 
having three occupants, the complaining witness, the defen-
dant Grant Cooper, and eleven year old Ferrell Sorenson. 
(R-31). Witness Ferrell Sorenson testified both at the 
preliminary hearing and at the trial that he did not see 
the purported assault at all and that all he knew about the 
matter was what Doral Elder, the complaining witness, had 
told him afterward. (R-77, 87). While the purported as-
sault allegedly happened in the forepart of April, 1947, on 
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the day when Doral Elder and Farrell Sorenson played tru-
ant from school (R. 60, 62), the complaint was not filed 
until May 3, 1947, (JR-3), approximately one month later. 
Also, that the tin1e alleged in the complaint was changed 
during the course of the trial with no explanation or rea-
son offered for said change. The evidence further disclo-
ses that during the time when the assault was purportedly 
·being made, the complaining witness and the Sorenson boy 
were in attendance at school according to the official rec-
ords of the school and according to the testimony of the 
principal of said school who taught the sixth grade and who 
made and kept the records of attendance of each of the 
above said boys. (R-137, 155). Moreover, the evidence re-
veals that each of the boys had been coached with respect 
to the testimony he was to give at the trial. (Doral Elder 
R-47, 48) (Farrell Sorenson R-71). The reputation of Do-
ral Elder for truth and honesty was bad (R-145), whereas 
the reputation in the community for truth and veracity, as 
well as for morality, of the defendant was good. (R-173). 
The evidence of the complaining witness as to the alleged 
assault was not corroborated. Also, the evidence discloses 
that the claimed assault came to light only after the mother 
of Doral Elder had caught Doral and another boy "Playing 
Nasty," at which time when asked where he learned such. 
nasty things Doral blamed this defendant. ( (R-21, 22). 
Inherently, the situation was such that the jury, with-
out a word of caution from the Court, might readily have 
let their imaginations and emotions control or influence 
their judgment in the consideration of the matter. 
Defendant does not claim nor argue that a cautionary 
instruction is a matter of right in all sex cases. In many 
cases and even in most cases the circumstances may be such 
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that an instruction of the character here considered would 
constitute an undue invasion of the province of the jury 
without just cause or reason. Defendant is not unmindful 
of the Court's decision in State v. Rutledge, 63 Utah 546, 
277 Pac. 479. In that case, however, the prosecution did 
not rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but was 
otherwise supported. The defendant respectfully submits 
that this Court has never held that in no event would a 
cautionary instruction be warranted or that in all cases, 
irrespective of circumstances, it would uphold the refusal 
of the trial court to so instruct. 
At the hearing on the motion below, the learned trial 
judge conceded that if there was ever a case where a cau-
tionary instruction was needed, it was the instant case. 
His Honor, however, took the view that such an instruction 
was improper and indicated that he would not give instruc-
tions of that character until he was taught to do so by the 
Supreme Court. 
There have been, and will continue to be, cases wherein 
the need for a cautionary instruction is so pronounced and 
so necessary as an aid in averting a miscarriage of justice, 
that the failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error. 
In People v. Vaughn (1933), 131 Cal. Appl. 265, 21 P (2) 
438, it was held, in view of the inherent doubtful character 
of the testimony as a whole, i. e., no complaint of mistreat-
ment made during or immediately after the alleged offense; 
the fact that the matter came to light only after the prose-
cuting witness had been taken into cusody by juvenile au-
thorities; and tender age of the prosecutrix; and the fact 
that the testimony was uncorroborated, that the trial court 
erred in refusing to give the cautionary instruction there 
requested. The Vaugn case, supra, was an indecent assault 
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case and the court pointed out in that case that the reason-
ing and remarks of the authorities with respect to rape ca-
ses were equally applicable to cases of lewd treatment and 
indecent assault. A more recent application of the same 
principles is noted in State v. Gannett (1938), 27 Cal. App. 
(2) 249, 81 P (2) 241. That case involved a prosecution 
for a crime against a 10-year-old child who had admitted 
having been coached as to her testimony, which testimony 
was uncorroborated, and the court held that the refusal of 
the trial court to give the cautionary instruction requested 
was reversible error. See also People v. Neal (Cal.), 150 P. 
(2) 13, and People v. Roberts (Cal.), 123 Pac. 628. The rule 
of the foregoing cases was approved by the Supreme Court 
of California (In Bane) in People v. Lucas, 105 P (2) 102. 
The same view has been taken and reversals ordered by 
the courts of other jurisdictions. State v. Slane (Wyo.), 
41 P (2) 269; State v. Connors (Wise.) 2 N. W. 1143; Rey-
nolds v. State (Neb.) 42 N. W. 903; State v. Clavenger, 
(N. M.) 202 Pac. 687. In State v. L®mer, 184 Pac. 723, 
725, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated: 
"Doubtless conditions may exist making such cau-
tionary instruction necessary, and in that case it 
should, of course, be given." 
There are several Utah cases wherein the need for cau-
tionary instruction has ben recognized. In State v. Mor-
asco, 128 Pac. 571, 574, where appropriate instructions had 
been given by the trial court, the Court stated: 
"The Court, as we have pointed out, instructed 
the jury that they should, because of the boy's tender 
years, axamine his testimony with care and caution. 
Thus the defendant's rights in this regard were fully 
protected." (Boldface supplied). 
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In State v. Zeezich, 210 Pac. 927, 929, where the wit-
ness was young and had been told by his mother what to 
say at the trial, the Court said: 
"They (the jury) were instructed by the court to 
examine the testimony of the child with care and cau-
tion on account of her tender years and susceptibility 
to wrong impressions concerning facts. The instruc-
tions in that respect were all that could be asked." 
As heretofore pointed out, in the instant case the pro-
secuting witness was an eleven year old child; his reputa-
tion for truth and honesty was bad; he had been coached by 
his mother as to the testimony he was to give; and his tes-
timony was entirely uncorroborated as to all material parts 
thereof. He made no complaint of any .mist~eatment at 
or near the time of the alleged assault and the evidence of 
assault came to light only after his mother had caught him 
playing nasty. The testimony of the respectable, non-in-
terested principal of the school established that the boys 
were in school during the entire month of April, 1947, with-
out missing a day of school; no one saw the boys with the 
defendant ·at or near the time of the purported assault, 
and there is only the confused testimony of the prosecuting 
witness that such assault took place. 
Defendant submits that in the light of the evidence 
and the circumstances of the case he was entitled to the 
requeSted instruction, or its equivalent, and that the fail-
ure and refusal of the trial court to so instruct constitutes 
reversible error. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND 
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT 
COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE BEEN PRO-
DUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
At the preliminary hearing the State, by its evidence, 
established tha1l the alleged assault occurred on Friday, 
the 18th day of April, 1947, in the defendant's automobile 
within the Orem City Cemetery. There was no indication 
that the offense might have occurred at some other time 
or place until trial when the same prosecution witnesses in-
dicated that the offense might have taken place on the 
8th day of April, 1947, or on some other date upon which 
Doral Elder and Ferrell Sorenson had played truant from 
school. At the preliminary hearing and at the trial both 
Doral Elder and Ferrell Sorenson testified that they had 
been in the Orem City Cemetery with the defendant be-
twen 2:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and that 
there had been no other persons present therein at that 
time. 
By the payroll records of Orem City the defendant 
had been able to ascertain that said City employed a care-
taker at the cemetery and had paid him for eight hours 
work in said cemetery on the 18th day of April, 194 7. Said 
caretaker, when contacted by defendant, stated that he 
. had been present in the cemetery on the date and at the 
times in question and was ready and willing to testify that 
he did not see defendant Grant Cooper accompanied by two 
boys in the cemetery and that had they been present there-
in, he would have seen and observed them. 
During the course of the trial the State's evidence, as 
aforesaid, changed the time of the alleged offense to some 
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unknown time about the 8th of April. The above said care-
taker had commenced work on the 15th day of April, at 
the said cemetery, and consequently could offer nothing 
in relation to an event purportedly occurring prior to that 
time. 
Immediately after the trial, and with due diligence, the 
defendant was able to ascertain that the City of Orem had 
employed a prior caretaker in the cemetery, which said 
caretaker had been on duty for eight hours each day except 
Sunday during the period April 1, to April 14th. Defen-
dant secured an affidavit from the prior caretaker (JR-36, 
37) which said affidavit states that the affiant was pre-
sent in the said cemetery for eight hours on the days above 
mentioned; that the Orem City Cemetery is so arranged 
and situate that one present therein probably would see, 
notice and observe automobiles entering or leaving the 
cemetery, and would probably see, notice, observe and de-
tect the presence of other persons in said cemetery during 
the hours mentioned; that although the affiant was present 
in said cemetery during the dates and hours above men-
tioned, and would probably have seen and noticed others 
entering or leaving or moving about in said cemetery, the 
affiant did not see Grant Cooper or any other person, ac-
companied by two young boys, in or about the cemetery 
during the period above mentioned; and that had Grant 
Cooper or any other person, accompanied by two young 
boys, entered the cemetery and moved about therein dur-
ing such times, this affiant would probably have seen, ob-
served, noticed and detected their presence there. 
In addition to the foregoing affidavit, the defendant 
was able to secure affidavits from two workmen who had 
·been working at the entrance to the cemetery during the 
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day of AprilS, 1947. Warren Merrill (JR-35) stated that on 
the 8th day of April, 1947, he, together with other men, 
was laboring at and building an approach to a bridge by 
the road leading into theOrem City Cemetery; that his po-
sition and work at that time and place was such that he 
could see, notice and observe the movement of traffic into 
or out of said cemetery; that he was able to see and notice 
the occupants of cars moving into or out of the cemetery 
and about the cemetery; that he knew the defendant Grant 
Cooper by sight; and that he did not see said defendant in 
or about the cemetery and that he believes that had the 
defendant Grant Cooper been in or around the said ceme-
tery at that time that he would have seen and recognized 
him. John Turner, another of the men working by the en-
trance to the cemetery on April 8, 1947,- furnished an affi-
davit substantially similar to that given by Warren Mer-
rill. (JR139). 
The matters contained in the foregoing affidavits 
would have been material, and admissible at the trial. The 
statements therein are direct and factual, and are relevant 
to the determinative issue in the case. They run to the 
merits of the controversy, and do not concern themselves 
with some collateral issue. The new evidence represented 
by the affidavits is of such character that it, when consid-
ered by the jury along with the other evidence, would leave 
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. This, we 
are taught, is the test. 39 Am. Jur. 173 - New Trial Par. 
166. 
Defendant realizes that applications for new trials on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence are not favored 
by the courts; that the courts generally take the position 
that the moving party has had ample opportunity to pre-
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pare his case carefully and to secure all of the evidence 
before trial. In the instant case the defendant had no op-
portunity whatever to produce the evidence here in ques-
tion. The affidavits bring into the picture new evidence 
which, owing to the circumstances of the case, the defen-
dant was precluded from having the advantage of at the 
time of the trial. The new evidence has sufficient proba-
tive force or weight to produce a result different from that 
which has been obtained at the trial. See Ren v. Jones 1 
P (2) 11; Hensly v. Com., 43 S. W. (2) 996. 
Nor, do the affidavits constitute cumulative evidence. 
True, it relates to a point which was at issue at the trial, 
but a new trial is not precluded in every case where the 
testimony relates to some matter which was contested. If 
such were the case, a new trial would seldom, if ever, be 
granted. The evidence here is of such character that it 
would probably so strengthen evidence already offered as 
to bring about a different result. 
Defendan~ respecfully urges that in fairness and in 
law he is entitled to bring before a jury the evidence of the 
aforesaid affidavits in order that the jury might have ac-
cess to the same in determining the guilt or innocense of 
the defendant, and that the denial of his motion for new 
trial was error on the part of the trial court. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UPON THE 
GROUND THAT CERTAIN ACTIONS AND STATE-
MENTS OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, PRE-
JUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF 
THE DEFENDANT, WERE DONE OR ALLOWED 
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AT THE TRIAL, WAS ERRONEOUSLY DENIED 
BY THE COURT. 
At the trial the defendant testified that his wife, Me-
lissa C. Cooper, had made accusations against him to a 
Doctor Weight of Provo, Utah. Dr. Weight was an M. D. 
(R.230) and was qualified as a psychiatrist. (R. 233). His 
qualifications were admitted by the State (R. 230). The 
accusations to the said Doctor by Mrs. Cooper had been 
made about one year prior to the date of trial of this cause 
(R. 233). After hearing the accusations by Mrs. Cooper, 
Doctor Weight called the defendant to his office and told 
him about the charges, and stated to the defendant that 
if the accusations were true he wanted to help defendant, 
and that if they were false he wanted to help Mrs. Cooper 
(R. 187). Doctor Weight examined the defendant several 
times (R. 187) . 
Upon objection by the District Attorney, the defen-
dant was not permitted to answer the following question: 
"Did the Doctor advise you whether you had 
homosexual characteristics?'' 
The objection of the prosecutor was that the answer 
called for a conclusion which the defendant was not quali-
fied to give, and that it was hearsay, and that it was in-
competent, irerlevant and immaterial (R. 188). In sus-
taining the objection, the Court stated (R. 190): 
"You see, the question there definitely is one that 
goes to the mental responsibility of the defendant, 
'Does he have homosexual characteristics'? That is an 
abnormality, it is insanity. And there is no plea of in-
sanity. The court is bound to sustain the objection." 
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At the outset counsel for defendant may not be remiss 
in pointing out that the foregoing statement on the part of 
the Court was very damaging to defendant's cause. Cer-
tainly the defendant would not and could not be expected 
to set up a plea of insanity or homosexuality when that 
was, inherently at least, the very thing that he was at-
tempting to disprove. The attitude of the Court, as reflected 
by the said statement, is consistent only with the idea that 
the Court thought and expected that the answer to the 
question would show an abnormality or insanity. The jury 
may well have taken their cue from the aforesaid statement 
of the Court, and proceeded on the theory that the Court 
thought the defendant to be homosexual. 
On the basis of his investigation and examinations Dr. 
Weight recommended that Mrs. Cooper secure employment 
to keep her occupied (R. 235, 236). The entire testimony 
of Dr. Weight and the testimony of the defendant relating 
to the examinations and investigations of Dr. Weight was 
ordered stricken as immaterial, and the jury were instruc-
ted to disregard the evidence completely (R. 219, 236). 
State's witness, Scott Wilkins, Orem City Marshal, sta-
ted on his direct examination that the first complaint that 
came to him came from the defendant's wife. (R. 98). Mr. 
Wilkins, without knowing anything about the purported 
cemetery episode, went to the boys themselves and found 
out about it from them (R. 105). He questioned many 
children without knowing that anything had actually hap-
pened (R.22A, 101, 106). Without checking into the mat-
ter, Marshal Wilkins advised Mr. Elder to file the charge, 
and picked the 18th day of April, 1947, at random. (R. 
110). 
Hence, the wife of the defendant was directly tied up 
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with the charge by the evidence of Marshal Wilkins. At 
the time the action was tried on this charge, the District 
Attorney was prosecuting the defendant upon a divorce 
complaint brought against him by his said wife. (R. 184). 
In his summary to the jury, the prosecuting attorney 
declared that the defendant was "Homosexual," and that 
the defendant had a diseased and depraved mind. By ref-
erences to the age of the children and to the number of 
children and to the enormity of the purported offense, he 
appealed to the passions, emotions and prejudices of the 
jury for a conviction. Defense counsel, choosing to meet 
and answer such argument, stated in his summary to the 
jury that the testimony of Doctor Weight, the only evidence 
bearing directly upon the matter of homosexuality, had 
shown that a competent doctor, one qualified to deal with 
such matters, did not regard the defendant as a "Homo-
sexual," but had shown that the doctor attributed the ac-
cusations to a frustration on the part of the defendant's 
wife. (Affidavit JR. 33, 34). 
Upon objection by the prosecuting attorney, the re-
marks of defense counsel with reference to Doctor Weight's 
testimony were ordered out of order, and the jury were 
instructed that they should disregard defense counsel's 
statement with reference thereto. The statements and pre-
judicial accusations of the prosecutor were allowed to re-
main. (JR. 33, 34). 
The district attorney, by pursuing an improper line of 
argument (made improper at his own instigation), there-
by invited a reply by defense counsel, and the reference to 
the testimony of the qualified psychiatrist was proper even 
though that testimony had previously been ordered stricken 
as immaterial. By his improper argument, the prosecutor 
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opened the door to a retaliation by reference to evidence 
that might not have otherwise been proper. State v. Dun-
can, 68 S. E. 684; State v. Hilton, 69 S. E. 1077; Annot. 
tion 78 A. L. R. 1500. Nor does the fact that the defendant 
failed to object to the use by the prosecutor of the extrava-
gant and intemperate language of such prejudicial nature 
preclude the Court from taking such language into account 
in determining whether a fair trial was had by the defen-
dant. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 70 Fed\. (2)~ 589,. 93 
A. L. R. 471; Annotation, 109 A. L. R. 1090. 
There can be little doubt but that the statements of the 
prosecutor were calculated to influence the jury. They 
were designed to arouse in the minds of the jurors a preju-
dice and resentment; to arouse animosity; and to impress 
the enormity of the purported offense. As pointed out by 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Holder v. State, 25 S. W. 
279: "A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, 'Acting 
in a quasi-judicial capacity'. It is his duty to use all fair, 
honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the con-
viction of the guilty, xxx. Nothing should tempt him to 
appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make 
statements to the jury, whether true or not, which have 
not been proved. The desire for success should never in-
duce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by argument based 
on anything except the evidence in the case, and conclu-
sions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same." See, also, State v. Irwin, 71 Pac. 608, 611. 
The statements and insinuations of the prosecutor were 
highly prejudicial to the defendant,. and were manifestly 
contrary to the only competent evidence offered in that 
respect. To permit such statements to stand, and at the 
same time deprive the defendant of his evidence in relation 
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thereto, is manifestly unjust. It deprived the defendant of 
the fair and just trial to which the law entitles him. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of the appellant that the judgment of 
the lower court should be reversed, and the case remanded 
for a new trial for the following reasons: 
1. That the Court erred in admitting testimony of 
purported assaults by the defendant upon the person of 
another, not the complaining witness, not connected with 
or relevant to the instant charge. 
2. The 8th Instruction of the Court was erroneous 
and prejudicial to the defendant. 
3. That in the circumstances of this case the failure 
of the Court to give the cautionary instruction requested by 
the defendant, or to give its equivalent, constitutes rever-
sible error. 
4. The Court erred in failing to grant the defendant 
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
which could not reasonably have been producd at the trial. 
5. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
a new trial on the ground that certain actions and state-
ments of the prosecutor were prejudicial to the substantial 
rights of the defendant. 
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial or-
dered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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